Introduction
Your internet provider's app offers a new switch: motion alerts, no cameras needed. A friend says the Wi-Fi owner can see everything you do on their network. A video claims your router can see you through the wall. Each of these is a different kind of Wi-Fi tracking, with a different watcher and different limits. The ten-minute video version of this guide is at the end of the page.
Can Wi-Fi track you? Yes, in three ways. Your phone finds its location from the Wi-Fi networks around it, and the same databases put your router on a map. Wi-Fi signals change when a body moves through them, and routers already turn that into Wi-Fi motion detection. And whoever runs a network sees which sites and apps you connect to, though not what you do on them.
Below: how Wi-Fi sensing works and what research has shown, how your router ends up on Apple's and Google's maps, what the owner of a network can and cannot see, and how to turn off Wi-Fi tracking where a switch exists.
Can Wi-Fi see through walls? How Wi-Fi sensing works
Short answer: Wi-Fi signals pass through most interior walls, and a moving body changes them in a way a receiver can measure. So can Wi-Fi track you in your house? A home router can tell that someone moved between it and another device. Detecting movement behind a wall is now within reach of anyone with a few cheap boards and open-source software. A recognisable picture of a person is not: even RuView, the open-source project that went viral with that promise, reports its pose accuracy as below target.
What is Wi-Fi sensing? Channel state information and beamforming
Wi-Fi cuts each channel into narrow subcarriers, 64 per 20 MHz in Wi-Fi 4 and 5 and 256 in Wi-Fi 6, and sends a slice of data on each. Walls, furniture and people reflect the signal, so every subcarrier reaches the receiver along several paths at once and arrives a little weaker and a little shifted. To decode anything, the receiver has to measure that distortion first, and it does so on every frame. The result is called channel state information (CSI): how much each subcarrier was weakened, shifted in phase and delayed.
In an empty room the CSI stays steady. When a person walks in, the set of paths changes, and the numbers start to move. Breathing and even chewing move them slightly, as Espressif notes in the documentation for its own CSI tools. Wi-Fi sensing means reading those changes on purpose. The router or a chip learns what "nobody here" looks like and raises an alert when the pattern breaks, which is how routers detect people without a camera, a microphone or any image. Some people call it Wi-Fi radar, though no extra transmitter is involved.
The second source of the same information is beamforming. Since Wi-Fi 5 (802.11ac), a router with several antennas steers its signal toward each device. To do that, it sends a test frame, and the device answers with a report of how it heard each antenna: a compressed version of its channel measurements. That report travels unencrypted, readable by anybody in range, in the words of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. CSI usually stays inside the chip and needs special firmware to read. The beamforming report goes out over the air regularly, and a nearby Wi-Fi card can record it without joining the network or knowing its password.
Can Wi-Fi penetrate walls? What stops it
Yes, most walls let it through. Drywall, wood and ordinary glass weaken Wi-Fi only a little, brick and concrete noticeably, reinforced concrete strongly. The MIT Wi-Vi paper lists typical one-way losses at 2.4 GHz: about 3 dB for glass, 9 dB for a hollow interior wall, 18 dB for 18 inches of concrete and 40 dB for reinforced concrete. Every 10 dB cuts the power tenfold, so a reinforced concrete wall leaves one ten-thousandth. NIST's measurements of building materials show the loss generally growing with frequency, so 5 GHz and 6 GHz Wi-Fi fade through walls faster than 2.4 GHz. A person in the path absorbs and reflects part of the signal too, and that change is what sensing picks up.
So what material can Wi-Fi not pass through? Metal: engineers use it to block radio on purpose, and NIST's own test range put a metal barrier between the antennas for exactly that. Elevator shafts and foil-backed insulation act the same way. Thick reinforced concrete comes close, while a typical apartment wall stops very little.
From MIT's Wi-Vi to Carnegie Mellon: what the research has shown
Headlines about this research usually leave out the conditions: what hardware was used, whether there was a wall, how many people took part. In the table, the colour of the hardware shows how close each result is to everyday equipment: green for special laboratory gear, orange for ordinary routers, red for any Wi-Fi card within range.
| Year and work | Hardware | What it showed | Limits |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2013, Wi-Vi (MIT) | Laboratory software radios on the 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi band | Moving people behind an 8-inch concrete wall, and how many of them, up to three | Only people who move. No image |
| 2018, RF-Pose (MIT) | Its own radar at Wi-Fi-like frequencies | Stick-figure poses through a wall | Not Wi-Fi hardware, though often reported as Wi-Fi |
| 2022, DensePose From WiFi (Carnegie Mellon) | Two ordinary routers of about 30 dollars each | A rough map of the body's surface in the room | No wall in the experiment. Much worse in a room it was not trained in |
| 2025, WhoFi (Sapienza University of Rome) | Ordinary routers and a neural network | Re-recognised the same person 95.5 % of the time | 14 people from a public dataset, short walks, a preprint |
| 2025, BFId (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology) | Any standard Wi-Fi card in range, no network access | Named the right person 99.5 % of the time among 161 volunteers, with no phone on them | Only people the model had already seen, in one hall |
| 2026, Xfinity WiFi Motion (Comcast) | The provider's gateway and devices already in the home | A motion alert in the app | Off until you turn it on. No position, no identity |
The "Wi-Fi X-ray vision" articles from early 2023, the ones that said Carnegie Mellon could map bodies through walls, were about that paper. Its experiments took place in the same room as the routers, and the word "wall" appears in it only in the titles of other people's work. Stick figures behind a wall do exist: they came from the 2018 MIT system, which used a radar of its own.
Can Wi-Fi identify who you are?
Telling Anna from Ben is harder than detecting motion, and it is what people usually mean when they ask whether you can track people using Wi-Fi. Researchers at Karlsruhe did it in 2025 without reading CSI at all, in work presented at the ACM CCS security conference. They recorded the beamforming reports that laptops and phones send to their router anyway, and trained a model on how each person's walk changes them. They recorded 197 volunteers, 161 of them gave usable beamforming data, and the model named the right person 99.5 % of the time. The press release rounds that to almost 100 %. The person being identified carried nothing: as the university put it, it is sufficient that other Wi-Fi devices in your surroundings are active.
The paper lists its own limits. The model only recognises people it was trained on, and the authors write that they could not test how it handles anyone outside the training data. The volunteers were mostly students, asked not to wear baggy clothes, walking in one hall, and the authors say the controlled setting may overestimate what beamforming data reveals. No use of this outside research has been reported. The headlines that ran in May and August 2026, "Ordinary WiFi can now identify you with near-perfect accuracy", were reposts of this same October 2025 study.
Can you build Wi-Fi sensing at home? ESP32 and GitHub projects
Yes, and cheaply. Espressif, the maker of the ESP32 Wi-Fi chips, says every ESP32 model can capture CSI, and its official tools include a demo of motion and presence detection. On GitHub, the open-source project RuView went viral with the promise to see through walls with Wi-Fi, measure breathing and track poses. Its own README is more careful: through-wall sensing up to about 5 meters, depending on the signal, a pose accuracy figure its authors call below target, and person identity marked as an experimental research capability.
When the developer channel Better Stack tested RuView in October 2026, it flashed the firmware onto three ESP32-S3 boards of about 10 dollars each, trained a small model with a webcam as the teacher, and got it to recognise eight different movements about 80 % of the time in one apartment. Thirty dollars of hardware gave a working motion classifier, with no image anywhere in it.
Xfinity WiFi Motion and other routers that detect motion
Motion sensing is already a product. In August 2026 Comcast expanded Xfinity WiFi Motion to its newer gateways as part of WiFi Shield, a security package included with Xfinity Internet: the gateway watches the signal between itself and up to five stationary devices in the home, such as a smart speaker or a thermostat, and sends an alert to the Xfinity app when something moves. It is off by default and uses no cameras, and Comcast says it is designed to detect motion, not to identify people or track exactly where they move. Two lines in Comcast's own FAQ matter for privacy: motion history is kept in Comcast's cloud for seven days, and Comcast may be required to disclose information generated by WiFi Motion in response to a subpoena, court order or search warrant.
Earlier products did the same. Linksys sold Linksys Aware as a subscription from 2019 and ended it in April 2024. In all of them, Wi-Fi motion detection covers the space between the router and the devices it talks to. It notices movement there, and it shows neither where in the room you are nor who you are.
802.11bf: the Wi-Fi sensing standard
Until recently every vendor built sensing its own way. On 26 September 2025 the IEEE published 802.11bf, an amendment to the Wi-Fi standard that lets devices announce that they can sense, agree on measurements and share them, in the usual bands up to 7.125 GHz and above 45 GHz. The Karlsruhe researchers urged that this standardisation add effective privacy protection. For privacy, the bigger change is scale: once sensing is part of the standard, any chip and any router can offer it in a compatible way, not only a few branded products.
Can police see through walls with Wi-Fi?
Not with Wi-Fi. What police in the United States have used is radar: handheld Doppler devices such as Range-R that sense breathing and movement behind a wall. They are purpose-built and have nothing to do with a home router. For thermal imaging, the Supreme Court ruled in Kyllo v. United States in 2001 that using a device not in general public use to learn details inside a home is a search, presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. No documented case of police using Wi-Fi sensing on a home has turned up.
Wi-Fi location tracking: how Wi-Fi finds your phone and your router
The second kind, Wi-Fi location tracking, needs no new technology. It runs on every phone, and it is how a map knows where you are indoors.
How your phone finds its location without GPS
Every Wi-Fi network has a hardware address called the BSSID. It is the MAC address of the router's radio, and a router usually has several: one for 2.4 GHz, one for 5 GHz, one for the guest network. Your phone hears these addresses from every network around it, sends the list to Apple's or Google's location service, and gets back coordinates. This Wi-Fi positioning works indoors, is faster than GPS and saves battery.
The database fills itself. Apple says your device periodically sends the geo-tagged locations of nearby Wi-Fi hotspots to Apple's crowd-sourced database, encrypted and without identifying you. Google describes the same thing: devices report the access points they observe shortly after they get a GPS fix.
Your router is on the map, even if you own no smartphone
Your own phone is not needed to put your router in the database. A neighbour's phone or a passer-by's is enough. In 2024, Erik Rye and Dave Levin at the University of Maryland showed what that database looks like from outside. Apple's location service answered questions about any BSSID with no key, no account and no Apple device, and for each address it returned up to 400 more addresses nearby. Over a year they learned the precise locations of more than 2 billion BSSIDs.
Then they watched the points move. Travel routers showed up in different countries as their owners moved. Starlink terminals appeared in Ukraine. After the power and network cuts in Gaza in October 2023, devices disappeared from the map. In a 2025 follow-up, the same group read BSSIDs off photos of routers listed on eBay and used them to locate sellers, and buyers after the sale. The only change Apple has documented since is the _nomap opt-out below.
How to opt your router out with _nomap
Both companies honour one opt-out: add _nomap to the end of the network name, so "Home" becomes "Home_nomap". Apple's wording is that this prevents devices from sending the access point's location to Apple. Three details change the advice. Apple does not promise to delete a location it already has. The tag does nothing on a hidden network, because passing phones never see its name. And when you change the Wi-Fi name, every device at home has to be connected again, because to them it is a new network. Google adds that each location service works independently, so other services are free to ignore the tag.
Does a hidden network stop Wi-Fi tracking?
No, and it can make things worse. A hidden network still broadcasts its BSSID in every frame, so the address that location databases store is in the air as usual. What it hides is the name, which is exactly the part that carries the _nomap tag. Apple's own router guidance tells owners to leave hiding off: it does not conceal the network, and because of how devices search for Wi-Fi, a hidden network might expose information that identifies you and the hidden networks you use, such as your home network. A hidden network does not announce itself, so your phone has to ask for it by name, and it asks wherever it is, in airports and cafés included.
WiGLE: the public map of Wi-Fi networks
WiGLE is a volunteer project that has mapped Wi-Fi networks for more than 20 years: people drive or walk with an app and upload what their phone hears. By 2024 it had collected about 1.19 billion unique networks, according to the Maryland paper. Searching the map needs a free account, and new accounts get a small number of queries a day. The same paper notes that WiGLE excludes networks whose names end in _nomap or _optout, so the tag covers it too.
MAC addresses, probe requests and private Wi-Fi address
Phones do not only listen. To find networks faster they send probe requests, small frames that ask "is anyone here?", and every frame carries the phone's own MAC address. For years that was the factory address, the same everywhere. Stores used it: in 2015 the US Federal Trade Commission settled with Nomi Technologies, which had collected the MAC addresses of about 9 million phones in nine months of 2013 while promising an opt-out it did not provide.
Phones now hide this. Android has used random addresses while scanning since Android 8.0 and a different address for each network it joins since Android 10. iPhones do the same from iOS 14. On iPhone this is the private Wi-Fi address, with three settings per network: Off uses the real hardware address, Fixed keeps one private address for that network, and Rotating changes it every two weeks. The iPhone picks Fixed for networks with WPA2 or stronger security and Rotating for open or weakly secured ones. Turn it off, and the iPhone shows a Privacy Warning for that network. Windows offers the same idea as random hardware addresses, which Microsoft describes as a way to make it harder for shopping malls and stores to track your movement.
MAC randomization protects your phone only. The router's BSSID never changes, and that is the address in the location databases. A random MAC address is easy to recognise: its second character is 2, 6, A or E, and the MAC Address Lookup marks such addresses as randomized instead of naming a vendor.
Wi-Fi tracking in stores and venues
The business meaning of "Wi-Fi tracking" is footfall: access points in shops, malls and airports count the phones near them and how long they stay. Cisco Meraki's documentation describes how: phones send probe requests at regular intervals, and access points detect them whether or not the phone joins the network. Random addresses change too often to count, so Meraki now leaves them out of its visitor numbers, and those numbers drop. The moment you log in to a store's Wi-Fi with an email or a loyalty account, the venue no longer needs the MAC address. It knows who you are.
Device names: what strangers see
Phones also broadcast a name over Wi-Fi. On an iPhone, the Personal Hotspot is a Wi-Fi network with no name of its own: Apple's instruction for renaming the hotspot is to rename the device, so "Anna's iPhone" appears in every Wi-Fi list nearby. AirDrop also runs over Wi-Fi, a direct link between nearby Apple devices that Apple calls peer-to-peer Wi-Fi, and a discoverable phone shows up there under the same name. In January 2024 the Beijing justice bureau said a forensic lab had recovered the phone numbers and emails of AirDrop senders from the hashed values the protocol exchanges. The simple defence works everywhere: a neutral device name, and AirDrop on Contacts Only. Since iOS 16.2, the Everyone setting switches back to Contacts Only after 10 minutes.
Can the Wi-Fi owner see your browsing history?
Can anyone see your browsing history on Wi-Fi? Not the history itself. The Wi-Fi owner sees a live list of the sites and services your devices connect to, with times and amounts of data. What you read, search and type is hidden by HTTPS.
What the Wi-Fi owner can see: site names, not pages
Two things give the site name away. Before connecting, your device asks DNS for the address of the site, and plain DNS travels unencrypted. Then the browser opens an HTTPS connection and names the site in the first message, the Server Name Indication (SNI), also in the clear. Encrypted Client Hello exists to close exactly this gap. The router sees "example.com" twice. It does not see "example.com/medical/test-results". Your address bar shows the whole link, but on the network only the site name is visible: everything after the first slash, the page and the search words in a Google link, travels inside the encryption, as the EFF's Surveillance Self-Defense guide explains. This holds only for HTTPS. On the rare site that still uses plain HTTP, the owner sees full links and everything on the page. HTTP/3 over QUIC does not change this: its first packets are protected with keys derived from a value sent in the clear, and RFC 9001 states that they have no confidentiality protection, so the site name can be read there too.
Whether the router keeps a record depends on the model. Many keep no list of sites, and eero, for one, says its software does not track browsing. Others make it a feature: Netgear's parental controls show a history of visited sites for each profile, and TP-Link's HomeShield lists the domains each device reached.
Does incognito mode or deleting history hide it?
No. Private browsing only stops your browser from saving history on your device. Google's own help page for Chrome says that organisations that manage your network, like your school, employer or internet service provider, may be able to observe your activity in incognito mode. Deleting your history deletes your copy. The router never had your browser history, only its own record of connections.
Apps, YouTube and Google searches
Apps use the same DNS and HTTPS, so the owner sees which services your phone talks to: YouTube, Instagram, a banking app. The video you watch, your search history on Google and the messages you send stay inside the encrypted connection.
Work and school Wi-Fi: what can my employer see?
On your own device, a work or school Wi-Fi network sees the same as any other: site names, times, amounts. Many organisations add a filter that blocks categories of sites, and they keep logs.
A device the organisation manages is different. If it has the organisation's own root certificate installed, a filtering proxy can open HTTPS connections, inspect them and pass them on, and the browser shows no warning, because the device trusts that certificate. Google documents this TLS inspection for managed Chromebooks, with a certificate from the web filter provider. On such a laptop, assume the organisation can see full pages.
What about your own phone with work apps on it? With an Android work profile, Google's help says the organisation can view and manage your work apps and data, while your personal apps, data and usage details are not visible to it. And once you disconnect from a school or office network, it sees nothing more of your traffic. Only management software installed on the device keeps working.
What a VPN, encrypted DNS and ECH hide
Encrypted DNS (DNS over HTTPS, RFC 8484, or DNS over TLS, RFC 7858) hides the lookups, and how encrypted DNS works covers which one to choose. Encrypted Client Hello (ECH, RFC 9849) hides the site name in the HTTPS handshake, when the site supports it. The ECH Checker shows whether a given site does. With both, the owner sees an address that often belongs to a big hosting network, not the site.
A VPN hides your traffic from the Wi-Fi owner: they see one encrypted connection to the VPN server. As the EFF's Surveillance Self-Defense guide puts it, what a VPN hides from the local network is all visible to the VPN provider, so the question becomes whom you trust more. The full comparison, including proxies and Tor, is in VPN vs proxy vs Tor. A VPN that sends DNS lookups outside the tunnel still shows the owner the site names, and a VPN test finds that kind of leak. Switching to mobile data has the same effect for the Wi-Fi owner: they see nothing, and your mobile carrier sees what they would have seen.
| What the Wi-Fi owner sees | Ordinary HTTPS | Encrypted DNS and ECH | VPN | Managed work laptop |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Site names | Visible | Hidden where the site supports ECH | Hidden | Visible |
| Full links, pages, searches, messages | Hidden | Hidden | Hidden | Can be read |
| When you are online and how much data each site gets | Visible | Visible | Only the total to the VPN server | Visible |
| Your device | Name and a private address | Name and a private address | Name and a private address | Fully known |
Wi-Fi tracking compared: who learns what
Side by side, the three kinds differ in who learns what, and in how far your own settings can reach.
| Kind of tracking | Location tracking | Motion sensing | Activity on the network |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who learns it | Apple, Google and other location services, and anyone who can query them | Your router or your provider's app. In research, any receiver in range | Whoever runs the network: family, school, employer, hotel, internet provider |
| What they learn | Where a router or a phone is, and where it moves | That someone moves at home. In the lab, also who | Which sites and apps you connect to, when, and how much data |
| What stays hidden | Your name: the database stores points on a map | Images and faces. There is no picture | Pages, searches and messages, thanks to HTTPS |
| What limits it | Partly: _nomap in the network name, a private Wi-Fi address. Old entries may stay | Partly: the motion switch in the router app. No switch for someone else's receiver | Mostly: encrypted DNS and ECH, a VPN, mobile data. Not on a managed work device |
How can I tell if my Wi-Fi is being monitored?
From your own device, you usually cannot. Watching traffic leaves no trace on the phone, and recording beamforming reports from the next room leaves none either. What you can check is the parts you control.
- Your router: its app or admin page shows who is connected to your Wi-Fi, any logging or parental-control features, and motion or "presence" features. An unknown device on the list deserves a check: the MAC Address Lookup names its maker, unless the address is randomized.
- Your device: a managed phone or laptop says so in its settings, and an extra root certificate or configuration profile you did not install is a red flag on a personal device.
- A network you do not control: assume the owner sees the names of the sites you connect to, and use encrypted DNS, an ECH-capable browser or a VPN if that matters.
How to turn off Wi-Fi tracking
There is no single switch, because each kind of tracking has its own fix and its own gap.
| What you want to stop | What to do | What it does not cover |
|---|---|---|
| Your router on location maps | Change Wi-Fi name so it ends in _nomap, then reconnect your devices | Old entries may stay. Other services may ignore it |
| Your phone recognised by its MAC address | Keep the private Wi-Fi address on: Fixed at home, Rotating on open networks | A network you log in to with an account knows who you are |
| Your phone calling out your home network | Do not hide the home network. Forget networks you no longer use | Nothing left: this one is fully fixable |
| Strangers seeing your name | A neutral device name, AirDrop set to Contacts Only | Nothing left |
| Motion sensing by your provider's router | Leave the motion feature off in the provider's app, or use your own router | Someone recording beamforming reports nearby. No user setting stops it |
| The Wi-Fi owner seeing your sites | Encrypted DNS and an ECH-capable browser, a VPN, or mobile data | A managed work or school device sees everything anyway |
| Someone taking over your router | Update the firmware, change the default admin password | Old routers that get no updates should be replaced |
For Wi-Fi security at home and on public Wi-Fi the pattern is the same: the names and addresses your devices broadcast can be changed, while the radio signal itself, which others can measure, cannot.
What sites see about you is a separate question from what the network sees. Run the Privacy & Trust Index check to see your IP address, its location and the other signals a website gets.
Watch the video version
The same three kinds of tracking in under ten minutes, with the router on Apple's map, the 197-person study and what the Wi-Fi owner sees, animated.
FAQ
Should you turn off your Wi-Fi at night?
For privacy it changes little. A router that is off cannot sense motion, and your devices stop sending beamforming reports for those hours, but the router's location is already in the databases and its signal returns the moment it is back on.
Can 5G see through walls?
Not today. Phones and cell towers do not image people. Using mobile networks for sensing is on the way, though: 3GPP, the body behind mobile standards, studied integrated sensing and communication for 5G in Release 19 and has published service requirements for 5G and 6G wireless sensing in Release 21. Its own use cases include monitoring breathing, and it lists security and privacy as open concerns.
Can a school track you after you disconnect from its Wi-Fi?
Its network cannot: once you are off it, your traffic goes elsewhere. A school-managed device or a profile the school installed on your device keeps working on any network.
Can the Wi-Fi owner see what sites I visit on my phone?
Yes, the names of the sites, the same as on a laptop. Apps give their servers away too, so the owner can tell that the phone talks to Instagram or a banking app. The pages, searches and messages stay hidden.
Can someone track my location through my Wi-Fi?
They can find where your router is if it is in a location database and they know its BSSID, which is why _nomap exists. A website does not see your Wi-Fi at all. It sees your IP address, which usually points to your city, not your street, as an IP geolocation lookup of your own address shows.
Can the Wi-Fi owner see what I search with a VPN?
No. With a VPN on, the owner sees one encrypted connection to the VPN server and how much data passes through it. Without a VPN they still cannot see your searches, only that you connected to Google.
What does the Privacy Warning in iPhone Wi-Fi settings mean?
Apple shows it when a network has reduced privacy protection. The common cause is a private Wi-Fi address turned off for that network, so the iPhone uses its real hardware address. Apple names three more: a hidden network, a carrier network the phone joins automatically, and a network that blocks encrypted DNS, so the names of the sites you visit travel unencrypted.
Sources
- Surveilling the Masses with Wi-Fi-Based Positioning Systems (University of Maryland, IEEE S&P 2024)
- The Spy Who Came in from the WiFi: Beware of Radio Network Surveillance (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)
- About privacy and Location Services in iOS, iPadOS, and watchOS (Apple Support)
- IEEE 802.11bf-2025: Enhancements for Wireless LAN Sensing (IEEE Standards Association)